Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings:

A Re-examination of Original
Congressional Intent
In 1793 Congress enacted a statute prohibiting courts of the United
States from granting writs of injunction to stay proceedings in any
court of a state.' Until 1941, however, the Supreme Court consistently
disregarded the broad language of the statute2 and created a large
number of judicial exceptions.3 In that year the Court, in Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,4 reversed this trend and returned to a literal
interpretation of the prohibition. This decision threatened to destroy
most of the judicial exceptions and led to a congressional revision of the
statute in 1948 to include three general exceptions. 5
Since the 1948 revision the Supreme Court has struggled with questions of how broadly these exceptions should be interpreted. 6 The
issues are difficult and the controversy evenly balanced. The interest
of effective protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
1 "... . nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.
2 In 1875 Congress enacted a minor exception to the general prohibition, permitting
injunctions to issue "where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to
proceedings in bankruptcy." REv. STAT. § 720 (1875). This provision was later incorporated
in the Judicial Code of 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
3 French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874) (state proceedings removed to federal
court); Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883) (federal
statute provided for exclusive remedy); Marshall v. Homes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891) (state
judgment obtained by fraud); Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904) (matter
already litigated in federal court); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (action
in rem where federal court first acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter).
4 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
5 "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964)
(enacted June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968).
6 In Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 US. 220 (1957), the Court held the
statute inapplicable and granted an injunction sought by the United States. The Court
did not rely on any of the three general exceptions contained in the statute. In Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965), the Court suggested that the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), might constitute an express authorization to issue injunctions
to state courts. The Court has also suggested that the Supreme Court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, might have the power to enjoin proceedings where lower federal courts
are without this power. Atiantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 US. 281, 296 (1970).
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laws of the United States pulls in one direction; the interest of preservation of the independence of state judiciaries pulls in the opposite
direction.
In resolving a particular case in favor of one interest or the other,
an understanding of the purposes of the original enactment is an important, perhaps decisive, factor in an otherwise evenly balanced case.
This understanding is especially important since the anti-injunction
statute was originally enacted only a short time after adoption of the
Constitution; such statutes carry the aura of fundamental or constitutional principles of American government.
In a recent decision, 7 the Supreme Court recognized the importance
of the purposes of the 1793 enactment in interpreting the present antiinjunction statute. In the Court's view, the original statute is a monument to the principle of independent state judicial systems.8 Taking
its bearing from this monument, the Court found that the present
prohibition "in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts." 9 This finding led the Court to
conclude that "the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory
construction."' 0
What the Court supposes to be a monument is actually a mirage.
The Court's analysis is premised on the assumption that Congress in
1793 wished to prohibit federal courts from staying state court proceedings. Convincing historical evidence contradicts this assumption. It is
the thesis of this comment that Congress in 1793 did not intend to
prevent stays effected by writs other than injunction, and that Congress specifically approved the use of the writ of certiorari to stay state
proceedings.

I
Several authors," including Justice Frankfurter and Charles Warren,
have attempted to discover the historical forces behind the enactment
of the original anti-injunction statute; all have failed to recognize that
the statute prohibited stays of state court proceedings only by writ of
injunction. Injunction was not the only writ used in American courts
7 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
8 Id. at 286.
9 Id. at 287.
10 Id. In Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971) and companion cases the Court relied
on the same historical view in carrying out this mandate.
11 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 US. 118, 129-32 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.); Durfee
fe Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a
Statute, 30 MIcH. L. RFv. 1145, 1145-46 (1932); Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal
Courts to Enjoin Proceedingsin State Courts, 42 YALZ L.J. 1169, 1170-72 (1933); Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAv. L. Rxv. 345, 547-48 (1930).
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in 1793 to effect a stay of proceedings; writs of certiorari, 12 super1
sedeas,'
habeas corpus, 14 and prohibition 15 also operated as stays.

Certiorari, on which this comment focuses. was one of the most com-

mon of these writs. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized courts of
the United States to issue "all other writs not specially provided for
by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective

jurisdictions."'" That Congress, in passing the prohibition of stays by
injunction, did not intend also to prohibit all the other existing forms

of effecting stays is suggested by five important considerations.

7

First, injunction was an equitable remedy, available only to courts
of chancery, whereas the other remedies were available to courts of
common law.' 8 During this period most of the states had separate

courts of law and chancery, 19 and there were clear distinctions between
remedies available in common law and equity. Many members of
Congress, including Oliver Ellsworth, the probable draftsman of the
anti-injunction statute,20 were lawyers who would have been thoroughly
12

See text and notes at notes 40-49 infra.

667 (6th ed. 1793); Curry v. Lovell, 6 F. Cas.
996 (No. 3496) (C.C.D.C. 1802); Hodgson v. Mountz, 12 F. Cas. 286 (No. 6569) (C.C.D.C.
1806); Armistead v. Marks, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 325 (1794); Cheshire v. Atkinson, 11 Va. (1 Hen.
& M.) 210 (1807).
14 See 4 M. BACON, supra note 13, at 675; Taylor v. Llewellin, 1 Md. 19 (1692); Bickham
v. Denny, 1 NJ.L. 14 (1790); Sharp v. Sinnickson, I NJ.L. 56 (1791); Smith v. Judges of
the Court of Common Pleas, 8 Cow. 27 (N.Y. 1824).
15 See 4 M. BACON, supra note 13, at 24; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 111 (St. George
Tucker ed. 1803); Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, I Bay 382 (S.C. Ct. of C.P. 1794).
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81. There is no record of any debates over either
the original all-writs statute, see I ANNALS OF CONG. (1789-1790), or the anti-injunction
statute, see 8 id. (1791-1793). The modifications made in the drafting of the all-writs
statute reveal nothing of congressional intent regarding writs to stay state proceedings. See
Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv.
49, 95 (1924).
17 The analysis in the text contradicts a dictum by Justice Washington in Ex parte
Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964 (No. 2278) (C.C.D. Pa. 1805), that federal courts were without any
power to interfere with state court proceedings. This dictum was relied upon in com13 See 4 M. BACON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw

mentary by Chancellor Kent, 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 412 (4th ed.
1840), and by Justice Story, 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNrrED

STATES § 1759 (3d ed. 1858). However, Justice Story, riding circuit, did enjoin state pro.
ceedings in Ex parte Foster, 9 F. Cas. 508 (No. 4960) (C.C.D. Mass. 1842). After the decision,
he vehemently defended the injunction against attacks by state judges. See C.G. HAiEs & F.
SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUFREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITIS, 18851864, at 200-04 (1957).
18 It appears that courts of both common law and chancery traditionally could issue
writs of certiorari. 1 M. BACON, supra note 13, at 349; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at
bk. 3, app. 20; 1 W. TIDD, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 394

(6th
writ
19
20

ed. 1817). But certiorari appears from the reported cases to have been primarily a
at law in early American courts.
See Wilson, Courts of Chancery in America-Colonial Period, 18 Ar. L.J. 226 (1884).
Ellsworth drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789. Warren, supra note 16, at 50. Ellsworth
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familiar with the separation. Given these facts, it is doubtful that Congress would have used the term "injunction" had it meant to include
writs used by common law courts.
Second, it seems certain that in 1793 Congress already would have
foreseen certain situations where it would be necessary for federal
courts to stay state proceedings. For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for removal into federal circuit courts of certain diversityof-citizenship cases initiated in the state courts. This provision presumably was enacted to prevent prejudicial judgments in state courts
against defendants from other states or from foreign countries. The
statute provided that, when the case is removed, "it shall then be the
duty of the state court to . . proceed no farther with the cause." 21
If the state court, contrary to this provision, elected to proceed after
removal, and the federal court could not act to stay the proceedings, the
protection which Congress intended in the removal provision would
have been destroyed.
In cases of removal and in a number of other circumstances the
Supreme Court found the necessity of effecting a stay in the state
court proceedings so compelling that it allowed injunctions to issue to
23
the state courts22 in patent contradiction of the words of the statute.
The Congress which passed the original anti-injunction statute comprised many men who had framed the Constitution and the durable
Judiciary Act of 1789. It is improbable that this Congress failed to
foresee at least some of the circumstances which the Supreme Court
later found so compelling or intended to prohibit stays in every one of
these circumstances. More likely, Congress presumed that, in at least
some of these circumstances, state proceedings would be stayed by com24
mon law writs.
was a member of the committee which drafted the 1793 Act. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 616 (1792).
He was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
21 Judidary Act of 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79. This clause conceivably could be read as an
implied authorization to federal courts to issue injunctions to stay state proceedings. Such
a construction strains the words of the clause which imposes only a duty on state courts
and contains no words conferring power on federal courts.
22 See cases cited note 3 supra.
23 With reference to the large number of exceptions to the statute, the A.L.I., STUDY OF
THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BErwEN STATE AND FEDEAL CouRTs, Tent. Draft No. 6, at
220 (1968), concluded: "The reasoning on which the exceptions developed will not bear
close scrutiny." For full exposition of the exceptions, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 US. 118, 132-41 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.); Durfee & Sloss, supra note 11; Taylor &
Willis, supra note 11; Warren, supra note 11; Comment, Federal injunctions Against
Proceedings in State Courts, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 546 (1947); Comment, Federal Power to
Enjoin State Court Proceedings,74 HAtv. L. REv. 726 (1961); Comment, Anti-suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 471 (1965).
24 An alternative, or perhaps additional, explanation is that Congress intended to
prevent only injunctions that issued directly to state courts, as contrasted with injunctions
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Third, the reasoning of Attorney General Edmund Randolph in
proposing a similarly worded provision 2 5 in December, 1790, indicates
an interest in limiting only the equity powers of the federal courts.
Randolph had proposed that "no injunction in equity shall be granted
by a district court to a judgment at law of a State court. '26 In explaining his proposal, Randolph said:
It is enough to split the same suit into one at law, and another
in equity, without adding a further separation, by throwing
the common law side of the question into the state courts, and
27
the equity side into the federal courts.
Randolph's proposal and explanation evidence an intent to prohibit
issued to the parties litigant in the state court. The Court allowed an injunction to a party
litigant on this ground in Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891), but has not recognized
the distinction since. Certainly, an injunction issued to a state court presents a more
serious interference with the state judiciary than injunctions issued to parties litigant, and

Congress reasonably could have intended to prevent only the more serious interference.
Durfee & Sloss, supra note 11, at 1154, rejects this notion on the ground that "[t]he whole
course of practice, ancient and modern, in cases of injunctions against legal proceedings,
has been to address the writ to the party litigant not to the court." While it is true that
the English rule was that injunctions to stay proceedings issued to parties litigant, R.
HENLEY (EDEN), A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCrIONs 4 (1821), it is not completely clear
that this rule was established practice in courts of the United States in 1793. Language in
Georgia v. Bralsford, 1 U.S. (3Dall.) 400, 405 (1792), indicates that the Supreme Court
may have issued an injunction directly to a circuit court rather than to the parties litigant.
Had the statute been intended to prohibit only injunctions issued to state courts, it
would have been consistent with the sentiment expressed by Justice Johnson in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (IWheat.) 304, 362 (1816), that, although the Supreme Court
could exert no compulsory control over state tribunals, it was supreme over persons and
cases to the extent of its powers. Such an intent would also align with the Court's position
in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), interpreting the l1th
amendment (which was proposed in Congress just two weeks before passage of the antiinjunction statute, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52) to prevent only suits directly against states,
but not suits which reached states through process against individuals.
25 Charles Warren concludes that the anti-injunction provision "was undoubtedly made
in consequence of" Randolph's proposal. Warren, supra note 11, at 347.
26 AM. STATE PAPERs, 1 Misc. No. 17, at 26 (report on the judiciary system, communicated
to the House of Representatives, Dec. 21, 1790). Randolph made an identical proposal
regarding circuit courts. .d. at 29.
27 Id. at 24. Under equity practice, an injunction to stay proceedings in an action at
law could be had in a court of chancery only if certain equitable elements, such as accident, mistake or fraud, were present. Theoretically, these elements could not be heard in
a court of law. After the injunction issued, the action at law remained suspended until
the chancery court decided on the question of equity and issued its decree. See generally
R. HENLEY, supra note 24, at 3-45. The action at law and suit in equity were considered
separate causes, since the equity suit contained the additional equitable element which
was never in question in the common law court. Arguments Proving the Antiquity, the
Dignity, Power and Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 21 Eng. Rep. 576, 587 (1616)

(report to the King by Attorney General Francis Bacon et al.).

1971]

Federal Court Stays

only equitable forms of effecting stays, 28 leaving the common law writs
unimpaired.
Fourth, an animosity to chancery had seethed in the colonies throughout the pre-revolutionary period.29 These interests were well represented in Congress in the years closely following the ratification of the
Constitution. In the first Congress, Senator Oliver Ellsworth, the probable draftsman of the 1793 Act, led the opposition to expansion of
equity power in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and this position eventually
dominated.3 0 On the Senate floor, Ellsworth and other Senators expressed a fear that the boundary between equity and common law
would be broken down and that the encroachment of equity upon
common law would be increased. 31 Justice Frankfurter examined these
same facts and concluded that this hostility to chancery was the primary
motivation behind enactment of the anti-injunction statute. 32 If that
were the case, the statute must not have been intended to inhibit common law forms of effecting stays.
Fifth, comparison of the anti-injunction provision with similar provisions in a comprehensive judicial code adopted earlier by the Virginia
legislature 33 reveals the probable intention of Congress. The Virginia
acts covered procedure in courts of both common law and chancery.
In the chapter concerning the high court of chancery, one section provided:
No injunction shall be granted to stay proceedings in any suit
at law, unless the matter in dispute be of value sufficient to
admit original jurisdiction in said high court of chancery,
etc.34
28 Randolph's proposal, unlike the eventual statute, covered only injunctions after
judgment, as contrasted with injunctions to stay proceedings which could issue before or
after judgment. In the sentence preceding the statement in text at note 27 supra, Randolph
said: "This clause will debar the district court from interfering with judgments at law in
the State courts; for if the plaintiff and defendant rely upon the State courts, as far as
judgment, they ought to continue there as they have begun." Am. STATE PAPERS, I Misc. No.
17, at 34. Randolph's opposition to federal court interference with state courts apparently
extended only to interference after judgment in the state court. Elsewhere in his report,
id. at 23, Randolph expresses a preference for issuance of certiorari by federal courts to
state courts before judgment, as compared with appeal to the Supreme Court after judgment,
in cases in which state courts act in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
29 See Wilson, supra note 19, at 226-55.
80 W.G. BRowN, LirE OF OLrvER ELLSWORTH 194 (1905); W. MAlAcY, SKrrrcHEs OF
DEBATES iN THE FutsT SENATE OF THE UNTE STATES 102-04 (1880). See Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129, 131 (1941); Warren, supra note 16, at 96-100.
31 W. MACLAY, supra note 30.
32 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 131 (1941).
83 Law of Oct. 26, 1792, ch. 11; Law of Nov. 9, 1792, ch. 12; Law of Dec. 13, 1792, ch. 13;
Law of Dec. 12, 1792, ch. 14; Law of Dec. 3, 1792, ch. 15, 13 Va. Stat. 405-67.
34 Law of Nov. 29, 1792, ch. 12, § 54, 13 Va. Stat. 420.
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The Virginia legislature passed separate provisions restricting the use
of supersedeas3 5 and certiorari36 to certain courts of common law. Members of Congress were probably familiar with the Virginia acts, since
James Monroe, from Virginia, was one of the members of the Senate
committee which drafted the anti-injunction statute. The presence of
restrictions on injunction, supersedeas and certiorari in the Virginia
acts, contrasted with the presence of restrictions only on injunctions
in the federal act, supports the view that Congress intended no restrictions on the other Writs.
II
In addition to this evidence-that the anti-injunction statute did not
prohibit issuance of common law writs-there is positive historical evidence showing that Congress specifically intended federal courts to have
power to stay proceedings in state courts by writ of certiorari. Certiorari,
a commonly used writ during this period,37 technically was an order
from a superior court to an inferior court to deliver a record;38 it
served to remove a case from the inferior to the superior court. Certiorari was undoubtedly one of the writs authorized by the all-writs
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 31
The issuance of a writ of certiorari by the superior court and delivery
of the writ to the inferior court operated to stay proceedings in the
inferior court. This proposition has support in English treatises40 and
in early American cases. Although there appear to be no recorded
American decisions which antedate 1789 holding that the writ stayed
proceedings, there are enough cases which closely postdate this year to
support an inference that when the original judiciary act was passed,
certiorari effected a stay of proceedings.
In a 1792 case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied an appeal
35 Law of Dec. 12, 1792, ch. 14, §§ 51, 52, 13 Va. Stat. 446.
36 Law of Dec. 3, 1792, ch. 15, § 67, 3 Va. Stat. 465.
37 1 L.K. WRoTH & H. ZOBEL, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 290, 301, 302 (1965), and 1
J. GOEBEL, LAW PRACTicE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 14, 16, 424 (1964), evidence frequent
use of certiorari in Massachusetts and New York respectively.
38 1 M. BACON, supra note 13, at 549; 1 Bouvian's LAw DierioNARY 443 (1914); A.
FTzHERBERT, NATURA BREvIUM 548 (1755); 1 L.K. WROTH & H. ZOBEL, supra note 37, at 302.
39 The Supreme Court has frequently issued common law writs of certiorari under'the
authority of the all-writs provision. E.g., In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S.
24 (1936); House v. Mayo, 324 US. 42 (1945); DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325
U.S. 212 (1945). See R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNTRED STATES § 309 (2d ed. R. Wolfson 9: P. Kurland 1951). Lower federal courts have
also issued certiorari under this provision. E.g., Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610
(10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921 (1953).
40 1 M. BACON, supra note 13, at 356; 4 id. at 676; 1 W. TrD, supra note 18, at 400-01.

1971]

Federal Court Stays

on the grounds that no record had come up from below. 41 Justice
Shippen said: "The regular method of bringing up the record is by
certiorari, and nothing else can stay the proceedings below."4 2 In 1808
the same court reversed a judgment that had been entered in a lower
court after certiorari had been delivered. 43 The court said: "After the
certiorari was read and allowed below, no further proceedings could be
44
had in that court until the suit was regularly remanded."
In 1800 the New York Supreme Court (at that time the highest court
in the state) held a justice of the peace liable for trespass for trying a
case after a certiorari had issued to the justice from a higher court.4 5
The Supreme Court said that when the justice proceeded "after his
power was taken away by the certiorari," he became a trespasser. 48
In an 1819 case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that certiorari
is in nature and effect a supersedeas, and that to require a writ of
supersedeas to stay further progress is error and productive of inconvenience. 47 One can also infer from two early North Carolina cases
48
that certiorari served to stay proceedings in the courts of that state.
A section of the Virginia judiciary acts of 1792 also demonstrates
that certiorari effected a stay of proceedings. The section provided that,
where certiorari is issued to inferior courts after issue is joined, such
courts "may proceed in the said cause or causes as though no such writ
had been sued forth." 49 The implication is that certiorari ordinarily
prevented the inferior court from proceeding.
If one accepts that Congress intended that federal courts have the
power to grant writs of certiorari and that it intended such writs to
operate as stays, the hard question remains whether Congress intended
that federal courts have the power to issue such writs to state courts.
An initial problem is raised by the fact that certiorari traditionally
could be issued only from a superior to an inferior court.", Due to a
paucity of historical evidence, the question whether the framers of the
Constitution and the early Congresses considered state courts to be
41
42
43
44
45

Walker's Appeal, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 190 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1792).

Id.

Gardiner v. Murray, 4 Yeates 559, 560 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1808).
Id. at 561.
Case v. Shepard, 2 Johns. Cas. 26, 27 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1800).
48 Id. at 28.
47 Mairs v. Sparks, 5 N.J.L. 606, 609-10 (1819).
48 Dawsey v. Davis, 2 N.C. 280 (1795): Anonymous, 2 N.C. 420 (1796). Orders to recommence proceedings in the inferior courts were issued in these two cases, because proceedings were not had in the superior courts after cases were removed there by certiorari.
49 Law of Dec. 13, 1792, ch. 15, § 67, 13 Va. Stat. 465.
50 See text and note at note 38 supra.
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inferior to lower federal courts has never been satisfactorily answered.
Neither the Constitution nor the Jiqdiciary Act of 1789 provides a
relative ranking of superiority. Hamilton argued in The Federalist
that under the Constitution lower federal courts could be given power
to review decisions of state courts. 51 Although Hamilton's argument
implies a superiority in the federal courts, in the absence of supporting
evidence the general question of superiority remains unanswered.
Nevertheless, the early existence of a power in federal courts to issue
certiorari to state courts is established by definitive evidence.
There are two sources of such evidence. The first is the position
taken by Attorney General Edmund Randolph in his report on the
judiciary system, communicated to the House of Representatives,
December 31, 1790.52 In introducing his resolutions, Randolph listed
instances which he felt should be in the realm of exclusive jurisdiction
of courts of the United States. He continued:
That the avenue to the federal courts ought, in these instances
to be unobstructed, is manifest. But in what state, and by what
form, shall their interposition be prayed? There are, perhaps,
but two modes: one of which is to convert the Supreme Court
of the United States into an appellate tribunal over the Supreme Courts of the several States; the other to permit a removal by certioraribefore trial. 53
By the words "before trial" Randolph apparently meant "before a full
trial in the state courts," because later in his statement Randolph speaks
of the privilege of certiorari as being available to a defendant "through
the whole length of the State courts."54
Randolph proposed that "the said circuit courts ...

may issue ...

writs of certiorarito the district or State courts, according to the rules
hereinafter prescribed." 55 This proposal should not be taken to indicate
that Randolph believed the circuit courts did not have the power to
issue writs of certiorari to state courts under the all-writs provision of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. Randolph's proposed bill was extremely comprehensive. Some of his proposals were already enacted in the 1789
Act.561 For example, elsewhere in his bill Randolph proposed that district courts have the power to issue writs of elegit, capias ad satisfacien51 Tim FrnsAusT No. 82, at 517, 518 (B. Wright ed. 1970).
52 AM. STATE PAPERS, 1 Misc. No. 17.
53 Id. at 23.

54 Id.
155Id. at 29. The "rules hereinafter prescribed" by Randolph concerned only matters of
procedure, such as amount at issue, venue, etc.
56 E.g., the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts over district courts. Compare id. with
Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 11, 22, 1 Stat. 78, 85.
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dum, fieri facias and levari facias,57 four writs of execution so commonis
that they already must have been encompassed in the all-writs section
of the 1789 Act. Randolph, in his certiorari proposal, was undoubtedly
doing no more than particularizing, as he did with these four common
writs, a power already given in general terms by the 1789 Act. Accordingly, it cannot be supposed that Congress, by not specifically enacting
Randolph's proposal, demonstrated any intent that federal courts
should have no power to issue writs of certiorari to state courts. But
Randolph's statement and proposal do evidence an atmosphere of approval of the issuance of certiorari from federal to state courts.
The second piece of evidence that the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized lower federal courts to issue writs of certiorari to state courts is
the fact that, in the period immediately after 1789, United States circuit
courts on at least two occasions did issue such writs. The first was issued
in 1790. Fisher Ames, in a letter dated January 6, 1791,19 described the
circumstances of its issuance.
Before the Constitution was adopted by North Carolina,
Robert Morris was sued there, his attorney ordered to trial
without delay, and of course, judgment for ten thousand
pounds against poor Bobby, as the New York boys used to call
him. He filed in their State Chancery Court, a bill, and obtained an injunction to stay the execution. In this stage of it,
the Constitution was agreed to and Mr. Morris obtained from
the federal Circuit Court a certiorarito remove the cause from
the State Court. This the supreme judges of the State refused
to obey, and the marshall did not execute his precept. The
State judges, knowing the angry state of the assembly, wrote a
letter of complaint, representing the affair. 60
The issuance of the writ was also documented in the correspondence
of James Iredell, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.61
In a letter to Chief Justice Jay dated February 11, 1791, he wrote:
57 Am.STATE PAPERS, I Misc. No. 17, at 28.
58 Randolph said of these writs: "These four forms of execution are intimately known

to every lawyer in the United States, being among the elements of his science, and having
their essence settled by adjudications." Id. at 35.
59 1 F. Amss, WoaKs 91, 92 (S.Ames ed. 1854) (letter to Thomas Dwight, Jan. 6, 1791).
See 1 C. WARREN, THE SuPREmE COURT IN UNITED STATS HISTORY 63-64 (1922), for further

discussion of this controversy.
60 Ames added: '-Whether the United States judges have kept within legal bounds is
doubted." It is uncertain whether Ames is referring to his own doubt or that of the North

Carolina court. F. AMES, supra note 59.
11 2 G. McREx, LIuE AND CORRsPONDENCE oF JAMES IREDEU, 322-25 (1949) (letter to
John Jay, Feb. 11, 1791); id. at 333-34 (letter to James IredeR from na. Sitgreaves, Aug. 2,
1791); id.at 37-38 (letter to John Jay, Jan, 17, 1792).
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A writ of certiorari issued from the Circuit Court of North
Carolina, by the direction of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Blair, and Mr.
Rutledge, directed to the Judges of the Court of Equity in
North Carolina, for bringing up a cause which (as an Executor)
I am one of the Defendants. The State Judges have refused
obedience to the Writ, expressly denying its authority in that
2
instance.0

In a letter dated January 17, 1792, Justice Iredell informed Chief
Justice Jay that the certiorari suit was still pending 3 and added:
To be sure the honor of the United States is deeply concerned
in their courts deciding solemnly whether the writ issued
erroneously, or ought to be enforced. It is of more importance
that it should not go off by an act of defiance of the State Court,
because the General Assembly of North Carolina in their session last Winter thanked the State Judges for their conduct in
disobeying the writ.64
The second instance in which a United States circuit court issued
a writ of certiorari to a state court occurred between 1792 and June,
65
1794, and is reported in the case of Washington & Beresford v. Huger.
A Mr. Hamilton, the British consul at Norfolk, had purchased a
plantation subject to a mortgage while a suit to foreclose the equity of
redemption on the mortgage was pending in a South Carolina court.
Hamilton petitioned the state court to allow him to enter the foreclosure suit to protect his rights, and he was allowed to come in as
a party to the proceedings. Afterwards, and before the trial of the
case, he obtained a certiorari from the circuit court of the United
States to remove the cause into that court. The writ was served to the
South Carolina court, which refused to obey it.66
As far as can be told, neither of these two circuit court decisions was
subsequently reversed on the grounds that federal circuit courts were
without power to issue certiorari to state courts. 7 These circuit court
at 324-25.
at 337-38.
at 338.
65 1 Desau. Eq. 360, 361-62 (S.C. Ch. 1794).
68 It was argued in the South Carolina chancery court that the all-writs section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized such action by the circuit court. The South Carolina
court rejected this argument, stating, first, that it was not an inferior court to the circuit
court, and second, that the provisions for removal contained in the 1789 Act (the conditions
of which had not been present in this case, see note 72 infra) excluded removal by any
means or under any conditions other than those specified therein. 1 Desau. Eq. at 361-62.
67 It is difficult to see how either case would have been appealed. The party who had
obtained certiorari could have no complaint, while the party against whom the certiorari
was issued was able to continue his cause in the state court, so would seem to have no
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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cases are important for two reasons. First, the decisions are seminal
interpretations by federal courts that the all-writs statute in the
Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized writs of certiorari to state courts. Because the decisions occur so close in time to the passage of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, they should be given heavy weight in interpreting the
meaning and intent of that act.
Second, at least one and perhaps both of these federal decisions had
come down prior to the passage of the 1793 Judiciary Act. The whole
Congress was surely aware of the first case, as it involved a United
States Senator and a Supreme Court Justice. Fisher Ames, who had
described the case in a letter,6 8 was a member of the House of Representatives. Because of the hot blood the decision had stirred in the
North Carolina legislature, the certiorari issue must have been a bone
of contention in deliberations on the 1793 Judiciary Act. The fact
that the act contained no prohibition or restriction on the issuance of
writs of certiorari from federal courts to state courts leads to the conclusion that Congress specifically approved the issuance of such writs.
The conclusion seems especially firm in light of the prohibition of
stays effected by injunction which was included in the 1793 Act.
The circumstances in which Congress contemplated certiorari would
issue from federal to state courts are uncertain. The requirements for
certiorari varied from state to state. In Pennsylvania, for example, certiorari appears to have been an ordinary means of bringing up proceedings from below. 69 In North Carolina, on the other hand, certiorari
was available only where appeal was not adequate to remedy an injustice done in the inferior court, or where the inferior court had
assumed a jurisdiction which did not belong to it. 70 The only certiorari
requirements contained in any early Supreme Court case appear in a
1799 opinion by Justice Washington:
A certiorari... can only issue, as original process, to remove
a cause, and change the venue, when the superior court is
motive for appeal. However, the South Carolina decision was apparently appealed or

reheard in some form. The following statement appears in the notation of the South
Carolina case: "It appears, by a note of chancellor Mathews, on his brief, that in some
shape this question discussed before the federal court, and that the 'federal court on the
appeal to them determined that Hamilton, having appeared in this court, by his petition
(to be heard) has made his election into what court he would go: and having acknowledged

the jurisdiction of this court, that (the federal court) would not take cognizance of the
cause." 1 Desau. Eq. at 362. This decision by "the federal court" is apparently unreported
elsewhere. It is significant that this federal decision was not based on the grounds that

the federal circuit courts were without power to issue certiorari to state courts.
68 Note 59 supra.
69 See Steiner v. Fell, 1 US. (1 Dall.) 22 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1776); Walker's Appeal, 2 US.
(2 Dall.) 190 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1792).
70 Street v. Clark, 1 N.C. 109 (Super. Ct. 1799).
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satisfied, that a fair and impartial trial will not otherwise be
obtained; and it is sometimes used, as auxiliary process, where,

for instance, diminution of the record is alleged, on a writ of
error; but in such cases, the superior court must have juris71
diction of the controversy.
Our knowledge of the factual situations involved in the two early
federal circuit court cases in which certiorari issued to state courts is
sketchy at best. Neither of these cases involved a situation where re-

moval was authorized under the removal provision of the Judiciary Act
of 1789.72 Neither was a case in which federal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction. However, it is unknown whether the petitioner for cer-

tiorari in either case was asserting a federal right. Nor is it known
whether either petitioner alleged that the state proceeding was unfair
or biased or that no adequate remedy of appeal existed.
CONCLUSION

Resistance by state courts and legislatures apparently discouraged
the use of certiorari or other common law writs for a sufficient period
of time that these writs were lost as methods of staying state proceedings.73 But knowledge that these methods existed in 1793 provides
important understanding of the anti-injunction statute. The original
statute does not stand, as the Supreme Court has assumed, for a
fundamental or constitutional principle of state court independence.
On the contrary, it reflects a fundamental approval by Congress of
stays of state proceedings by federal courts by means other than injunction, and an intention to let the federal courts themselves work out
the situations in which such stays would issue. Insofar as the Supreme
Court and other federal courts rely on the background and policy of
the 1793 statute to aid them in interpreting present law, these facts
should be considered.
Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 413 (1799).
§ 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, allowed removal only by the defendant
in the state court. In the North Carolina case, certiorari was sought by the plaintiff in
equity. In the South Carolina case, the party seeking certiorari had petitioned to be allowed
to enter the state court proceedings, so was not technically a defendant. Also, he had not
posted surety, as required by the removal section of the Judiciary Act.
73 In Superior Court v. United States Dist. Court, 256 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1958),. the Ninth Circuit overturned the issuance of certiorari from a federal district
court to a state court on the grounds that the district court's action was unprecedented,
and that it was improper because the district court was not superior to the state court.
The Supreme Court has never passed on the power of federal courts to issue common law
writs of certiorari to state courts.
71
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